Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens

United States President Trump Issued a New Executive Order: Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens

March 6, 2026

SCARS Institute Introduction

As cyber-enabled scams continue to grow, tens of millions of Americans are feeling the impact. Last year alone, these crimes caused more than $12.5 billion (what was reported) in losses, affecting young adults & teens, families, elderly & retirees, and individuals across the country. In response to this growing threat, President Donald J. Trump signed a new Executive Order on March 6, 2026, titled “Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens.” The order recognizes that scams are not isolated incidents but part of large, organized criminal operations (Transnational Criminal Organizations – TCOs) that operate across international borders.

Most of the scams that harm victims today are run by transnational criminal organizations that specialize in online fraud. These groups carry out schemes such as romance scams, crypto investment scams, ransomware attacks, phishing campaigns, sextortion, impersonation scams, and employ other deceptive tactics designed to manipulate trust and exploit vulnerability. In many cases, these operations function openly in countries where authorities fail to stop them or quietly tolerate their activities. The Executive Order states that protecting American citizens from these crimes is a national priority and calls for stronger action across law enforcement, diplomacy, the military, and other government agencies.

The directive also emphasizes that victims deserve support and recognition. It instructs federal agencies to focus not only on stopping criminal networks but also on helping people who have already been harmed. One of the goals is to disrupt scam operations more quickly, hold the people behind them accountable, and punish governments that allow these crimes to operate within their borders and that fail to take action.

To begin this process, the Executive Order requires a coordinated effort across the entirety of the U.S. federal government. Agencies have been directed to conduct a 60-day review of the tools and resources currently available to fight cybercrime and online fraud. After that review, officials will develop a 120-day action plan that identifies the major criminal organizations behind these scams and outline strategies to disrupt or destroy their operations. The plan will also establish a dedicated operational team within the National Coordination Center to focus specifically on these threats and strengthen federal prosecutions against those responsible.

Another important element of the order focuses on financial recovery for victims. The directive calls for recommendations to create a Victims Restoration Program that could return seized funds to people who were defrauded. While recovering stolen money is often difficult, this effort signals that the government recognizes the importance of helping victims rebuild after financial loss.

The order also addresses the international nature of modern scams. The U.S. Department of State has been tasked with working directly with foreign governments to encourage stronger enforcement against cybercrime groups operating within their borders. If governments refuse to act, the Executive Order allows for additional pressure through measures such as sanctions, visa restrictions, other diplomatic consequences, and potential military operations.

This new directive was released alongside a broader initiative known as “President Trump’s Cyber Strategy for America.” Together, these efforts aim to strengthen the country’s response to online crime and make it much more difficult for criminal networks to exploit digital systems and human trust.

For victims of scams, the announcement reflects existing recognition that these crimes are serious, organized, and widespread. The focus on coordinated enforcement, international pressure, and potential financial restoration represents an attempt to shift attention toward both prevention and victim support. While no policy can immediately eliminate online fraud, the strategy signals a stronger commitment to disrupting the criminal networks behind these schemes and improving protection for Americans in an increasingly connected world.

SCARS Institute Analysis and Summarization of the Executive Order

Detailed Analysis of Impacts and Potential Benefits

This Presidential Executive Order is more tactical and implementation-focused than a broad strategy document, emphasizing disruption of criminal networks, victim restitution, and international accountability. Below is a breakdown of its potential impacts and benefits across multiple categories, based on the order’s directives, stated goals, and realistic expectations from similar past U.S. cyber/fraud initiatives (e.g., prior DOJ operations against scam rings, sanctions on cyber actors, and asset forfeiture programs).

For Cybercrime and Scam Victims (Primarily American Citizens)

• Direct Benefits:
  • The proposed Victims Restoration Program could be transformative if implemented effectively. Currently, seized funds from fraudsters (via civil/criminal forfeiture) often go to general Treasury coffers; redirecting them to victims would provide tangible financial recovery, potentially covering partial or full losses for individuals hit by scams, sextortion, or ransomware.
  • Heightened federal prioritization of prosecutions could lead to more arrests, takedowns, and deterrence, reducing the volume of active scams targeting vulnerable groups (e.g., seniors, who suffer disproportionate losses).
  • Improved state/local resilience support (training, tools) could enhance local reporting and response, making it easier for victims to seek help and for authorities to act quickly.
• Potential Impacts:
  • Short-term: Faster disruption of ongoing campaigns could prevent additional victims.
  • Long-term: If the Victims Restoration Program becomes operational (with clear eligibility, streamlined claims, and sufficient recovered funds), it could restore trust in reporting scams and encourage more victims to come forward, breaking the cycle of underreporting.
  • Challenges: Benefits depend on successful asset seizures (which can be limited by offshore operations or crypto use) and program design (e.g., avoiding bureaucracy that delays payouts).

Overall, this Presidential Executive Order could provide more meaningful relief than prior efforts, shifting from prevention-only to restitution-focused outcomes.

For Governments Around the World

• Benefits:
  • Cooperative nations could gain from U.S. intelligence sharing, joint operations, and technical assistance in dismantling Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating on their soil (e.g., scam centers in Southeast Asia or Eastern Europe).
  • The Presidential Executive Order’s emphasis on diplomacy and consequences could pressure host governments to act, potentially leading to bilateral agreements or multilateral task forces.
• Impacts:
  • Non-cooperative or tolerant nations face escalating costs (sanctions, visa bans, tariffs, aid cuts, and even unilateral military action), which could incentivize crackdowns to avoid economic/diplomatic fallout.
  • Global ripple effects: Successful U.S.-led disruptions could reduce cross-border cybercrime flows, benefiting allied governments dealing with similar threats (e.g., EU countries facing ransomware, or Asian nations hosting scam farms).
  • Potential drawbacks: Some governments might view U.S. unilateral actions or sanctions as overreach, straining relations if applied broadly.

The Presidential Executive Order positions the U.S. as a leader in global enforcement, building stronger international coalitions against cybercrime.

Against Scammers and Organized Crime Groups (TCOs)

• Direct Negative Impacts:
  • Increased risk of identification, disruption, and dismantlement through the dedicated NCC operational cell and action plan.
  • Heightened U.S. prosecution focus could lead to more extraditions, arrests, and long sentences for key operators.
  • Financial pressure via asset seizures/forfeitures, sanctions on affiliated entities/individuals, and diplomatic pressure on safe-haven countries.
  • Operational cells could enable faster takedowns of infrastructure (e.g., botnets, phishing sites, money mules).
• Potential Benefits (from the Criminal Perspective — None Intended):
  • None substantive; the Presidential Executive Order is designed to raise costs and reduce impunity significantly.

Overall, this could make cyber-enabled fraud a much higher-risk enterprise, forcing TCOs to adapt (e.g., greater obfuscation) or scale back operations targeting U.S. victims.

Overall Potential to Reduce or Prevent Scams, Fraud, and Cybercrime

• Reduction Mechanisms:
  • Deterrence through prioritized prosecutions and international consequences.
  • Disruption via targeted operational cells and TCO-focused action plans.
  • Prevention through better tools, state/local hardening, and diplomatic enforcement.
  • Victim Recovery as a feedback loop to encourage reporting and weaken criminal profitability.
• Expected Scale of Impact:
  • Medium- to high-potential in the near term (1–3 years) for specific scam types (e.g., romance scams, tech support fraud, sextortion) if the action plan leads to high-profile takedowns.
  • Broader cybercrime (e.g., ransomware by state-linked actors) may see less immediate effect, as the Presidential Executive Order prioritizes TCOs over nation-state threats.
  • Measurable outcomes could include lower reported losses (FTC/IC3 data), more disrupted networks, and increased restitutions.
• Success Factors and Limitations:
  • Success hinges on rapid implementation of the review/action plan, adequate funding/resources for the NCC cell, and sustained interagency coordination.
  • Challenges include the global, decentralized nature of these crimes (e.g., crypto anonymity, jurisdictional hurdles) and potential for criminals to migrate to new tactics or targets.
  • Synergy with the companion Cyber Strategy (emphasizing offensive operations and superiority in tech) could amplify effects if both are pursued aggressively.

In summary, this Presidential Executive Order represents a pragmatic, victim-focused escalation in the fight against cyber-enabled fraud and scams. By combining enforcement, restitution, disruption, and international pressure, it has strong potential to deliver measurable benefits for victims, deter criminals, and push global partners toward accountability—though full realization will depend on follow-through in the coming months and years.

The Use of the United States Military Against TCOs

The Executive Order does not explicitly state that the United States will use military force against scam organizations or transnational cybercrime groups. However, several elements of the language used in the order allow us to infer how the U.S. government may expand its response to large-scale cyber fraud networks, including the possibility of military or intelligence involvement under certain circumstances.

Understanding these implications requires looking at the strategic signals embedded in the policy language.

1. First, the order frames cyber-enabled fraud as a national security issue rather than only a law enforcement problem. When a government formally defines an activity as a threat to national security, it opens the door for agencies beyond traditional policing to participate. In the United States, that can include intelligence agencies and, in some circumstances, the Department of War. The policy’s emphasis on coordinated action across law enforcement, diplomacy, and “other instruments of national power” suggests that the response will extend beyond the normal boundaries of criminal investigation.
2. Second, the Executive Order highlights the role of transnational criminal organizations. When cyber fraud networks are described as Transnational Criminal Organizations, they are placed in the same strategic category as drug cartels, trafficking syndicates, and other large criminal enterprises that operate across borders. The U.S. government has historically used a broad toolkit against such groups. In the past, responses to major transnational crime networks have included intelligence operations, financial sanctions, cyber disruption activities, and coordination with foreign security forces.
3. Third, the order appears to allow for offensive cyber operations. Although the details are not public, national cyber strategies often permit government agencies to disrupt criminal infrastructure directly. This can include disabling servers used for scams, dismantling botnets, blocking financial pipelines, or targeting digital infrastructure that supports criminal operations. In the United States, such actions are often conducted jointly by agencies such as U.S. Cyber Command, National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the threat crosses into national security territory.
4. Fourth, the order includes diplomatic pressure on countries that harbor cybercrime operations. This part of the policy signals that the United States may treat persistent cyber-fraud safe havens as geopolitical problems rather than isolated criminal matters. If governments fail to act against large scam operations within their borders, the U.S. government may escalate responses through sanctions, visa restrictions, or economic measures. In extreme cases, sustained cyber threats originating from a particular region could eventually justify covert disruption operations.
5. Fifth, the reference to “commensurate responses” across different national capabilities suggests flexibility in the government’s approach. That phrase typically indicates that policymakers want the ability to match the scale of the response to the scale of the threat. For small fraud networks, the response will likely remain traditional law enforcement. For massive, organized networks generating billions of dollars and operating across multiple countries, responses could involve intelligence operations or coordinated international security actions.

However, it is important to understand the limits. Direct military strikes against scam call centers or fraud operations in foreign countries are highly unlikely under normal circumstances. This is mostly due to the recognition that scam call centers house innocents and trafficked persons. Military involvement, if it occurs, would almost certainly take indirect forms. These could include cyber operations, intelligence gathering, support for foreign law enforcement, or targeting criminal infrastructure rather than physical facilities. However, removal of leadership would remain a viable option.

Another likely outcome of the Executive Order is increased intelligence sharing and targeting of the financial ecosystem behind cybercrime with America’s reliable partners. Scam organizations depend heavily on money-laundering networks, cryptocurrency channels, and global payment systems. U.S. agencies may increasingly treat these financial pipelines as strategic targets. Disrupting the movement of money often proves more effective than trying to arrest individual scammers operating overseas. This could mean that the Trump administration could enact U.S. Law – S.3643 – 118th Congress through executive orders instead of waiting on Congress.

The order may also lead to stronger coordination with allied governments. Large scam operations are now frequently linked to organized crime groups operating in Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, West Africa, Latin America, and other regions. A coordinated international response could include joint investigations, extradition efforts, cyber disruption campaigns, and sanctions against individuals, companies, or governments facilitating fraud operations.

For victims, one important takeaway is that the language of the Executive Order reflects a shift in how governments are beginning to understand scams. Online fraud is no longer viewed simply as isolated deception carried out by individuals. It is increasingly recognized as part of a global organized-crime ecosystem that operates at an industrial scale.

This shift in perspective matters because it changes the tools governments are willing to use. When cybercrime is treated as a national security issue, governments can mobilize intelligence agencies, international pressure, financial sanctions, and coordinated cyber operations. Those tools can sometimes reach criminals who operate outside the normal reach of domestic law enforcement.

In practical terms, the Executive Order signals three likely developments in the coming years. Governments will treat large cyber fraud networks more like organized crime syndicates than individual scammers. Intelligence and cyber capabilities will increasingly be used to disrupt criminal infrastructure. And countries that allow large scam operations to operate openly may face growing diplomatic and economic pressure. It may also signal a shift to use terrorist labeling on them as well.

While this does not mean military forces will begin targeting scammers directly immediately, it does indicate that the response to large-scale cyber fraud may expand into areas that historically belonged to national security and intelligence communities rather than traditional police investigations.

Executive Order
Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1.  Purpose and Policy.

Cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes are draining American families of their life savings, stealing the benefits of years of work, and destroying the lives of our youth.  These activities — which include deploying ransomware and malware, phishing, financial fraud, “sextortion” and other extortion schemes, impersonation, and more — are often coordinated campaigns carried out by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) aimed at the most vulnerable among us.  In many cases, foreign regimes provide willing or tacit state support to cybercrime and predatory schemes, creating a shadow economy fueled by stolen identities, coercion, forced labor, and human trafficking.

It is the policy of the United States to protect Americans from, and harden our financial and digital systems against, these threats.  The United States shall counter attacks on Americans with a commensurate response that includes law enforcement, diplomacy, and potential offensive actions.  It is further the policy of the United States to provide support to victims of these crimes, expand public alerts, and prioritize protection for those most at risk to end the exploitation and victimization of Americans.

Sec. 2.  Combating Scam Centers and Cybercrime.

(a)  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Office of the National Cyber Director, and in coordination with the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor (APHSA), shall:

(i)   within 60 days of the date of this order, review the relevant operational, technical, diplomatic, and regulatory frameworks in place to determine how each can be improved to best combat TCOs engaged in cyber-enabled crime and similar predatory schemes against Americans; and

(ii)  within 120 days of the date of this order, using the results of the review directed in subsection (a)(i) of this section, submit to the President, through the APHSA, an action plan that identifies the TCOs responsible for scam centers and cybercrime and proposes solutions to prevent, disrupt, investigate, and dismantle these TCOs.  This action plan shall provide for the creation of an operational cell within the National Coordination Center (NCC) established pursuant to section 6(d) of Executive Order 14159 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the American People Against Invasion), which will be responsible for coordinating Federal efforts to detect, disrupt, dismantle, and deter — including by involving the private sector as appropriate — cyber-enabled criminal activity conducted by foreign TCOs and associated networks that target United States persons, businesses, critical infrastructure, or public services.

(b)  The action plan shall describe how, consistent with applicable law, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, supported by the Secretary of War, shall use relevant technical capabilities, threat intelligence, and operational insights from commercial cybersecurity firms and other non-Federal entities, as appropriate, to enhance attribution, tracking, and disruption of malicious cyber actors and enabling infrastructure engaged in cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes.

(c)  The action plan and NCC operational cell shall include mechanisms to improve information sharing, operational coordination, and rapid response across the Federal Government, and shall align with existing law enforcement frameworks and efforts to counter cyber-enabled threats emanating from foreign jurisdictions.

(d)  The Attorney General shall continue to prioritize prosecutions of defendants engaged in cyber-enabled fraud, including scam centers and sextortion schemes, and, consistent with the principles of Federal prosecution, shall pursue the most serious, provable offenses encompassed by such fraudulent schemes.

(e)  To the maximum extent permitted by law, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, shall partner with the NCC to provide training, technical assistance, and resilience building to support State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners, including to expand defensive capacity, share threat intelligence, and harden SLTT partners’ critical infrastructure systems against cybercrime exploitation by TCOs.

Sec. 3.  Victim Restoration Program.

Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General shall submit a recommendation to the President, through the APHSA, regarding the establishment of a Victims Restoration Program designed to provide, to the greatest extent authorized by law and in consideration of the Department of Justice’s goal of serving all victims of crime, restoration or remission to victims of cyber-enabled fraud schemes from funds clawed back, forfeited, or seized from the TCOs that perpetrate such schemes.

Sec. 4.  International Engagement.

The Secretary of State, in coordination with the NCC, shall engage with foreign governments to demand enforcement actions against TCOs operating within their borders and greater cooperation with United States law enforcement.  The Secretary of State shall take all necessary and appropriate steps to ensure that nations that tolerate such predatory activity shall face consequences consistent with United States law and policy, such as the limitation of foreign assistance, the application of targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, trade penalties, and, where appropriate, the immediate expulsion from the United States of foreign officials and diplomats complicit in these schemes.  The Secretary of State shall also coordinate these actions with allies and partners to enhance the consequences of actions taken against nations that tolerate predatory activity.

Sec. 5.  General Provisions.

(a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise effect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.

Signed: DONALD J. TRUMP

SCARS Institute Conclusion

The Executive Order issued on March 6, 2026, reflects a significant shift in how the United States government is approaching cyber-enabled fraud and large-scale scam operations. Rather than treating these crimes as isolated incidents of deception, the policy recognizes them as organized criminal enterprises that operate across borders and generate billions of dollars in losses each year. This change in perspective carries important implications for enforcement, international cooperation, and the recognition of victims.

The directive places stronger emphasis on coordinated federal action, combining law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, financial enforcement, and intelligence capabilities to disrupt transnational criminal organizations responsible for large fraud networks. By requiring a structured review followed by a detailed national action plan, the order attempts to move the government response from reactive investigations toward proactive disruption of criminal infrastructure and financial pipelines.

Another meaningful element is the proposed Victims Restoration Program. While asset recovery in cybercrime cases is often difficult, the acknowledgment that seized funds should be redirected to victims represents a step toward addressing the financial harm caused by scams. If implemented effectively, such a program could encourage greater reporting and help individuals rebuild after severe financial loss.

The order also signals that governments that tolerate large scam operations may face increasing diplomatic and economic consequences. This approach reflects the growing understanding that cyber-enabled fraud is not only a criminal issue but also a global security and governance challenge.

Although no single policy can eliminate online fraud, the directive indicates a stronger federal commitment to disrupting criminal networks, supporting victims, and applying broader national capabilities against organized cybercrime. The long-term impact will depend on how effectively the review process, operational coordination, and international engagement translate into sustained enforcement and measurable disruption of these criminal ecosystems.

Glossary

• Action Plan — The action plan refers to the 120-day follow-up document required after the federal review. It is intended to identify the major transnational criminal organizations behind scam centers and cyber-enabled crime, and set out practical steps to prevent, disrupt, investigate, and dismantle them.
• Allied Governments — Allied governments are partner nations that may work with the United States to increase the consequences for countries that tolerate predatory cyber activity. Their involvement matters because coordinated international pressure can make it harder for criminal networks to move money, people, and infrastructure across borders.
• APHSA — APHSA refers to the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor, who serves as a coordinating channel for the review, recommendations, and action plan described in the order. This role matters because centralized coordination often improves follow-through across agencies that might otherwise act separately.
• Applicable Law — Applicable law refers to the legal boundaries that govern how the Executive Order may be carried out. This language is important because it reminds victims that even strong policy language must still operate within existing statutes, authorities, and funding limits.
• Asset Forfeiture — Asset forfeiture is the legal process through which the government takes control of funds or property connected to criminal activity. In the context of scam recovery, it matters because seized criminal proceeds may become one of the few realistic sources of partial financial restoration for victims.
• Attribution — Attribution is the process of identifying who is responsible for malicious cyber activity, fraud operations, or enabling infrastructure. It is important because victims often face anonymous attackers, and stronger attribution can help investigators connect crimes to real organizations, networks, and decision-makers.
• Bilateral Agreements — Bilateral agreements are cooperative arrangements between two governments to support enforcement, investigations, or intelligence sharing. These agreements matter because scam networks usually cross borders, and one country acting alone may have limited reach.
• Botnets — Botnets are networks of compromised computers or devices that criminals can control remotely to spread malware, launch attacks, or support fraud infrastructure. Their disruption matters because large scam and cybercrime operations often depend on automated systems to scale harm quickly.
• Civil and Criminal Forfeiture — Civil and criminal forfeiture are legal mechanisms used to seize assets tied to unlawful conduct, whether through civil proceedings or criminal prosecution. In this policy setting, they are important because they may create the pool of money that could eventually support victim restoration.
• Clawed Back Funds — Clawed back funds are stolen or criminally connected assets that authorities manage to recover after a fraud scheme or enforcement action. For victims, this term matters because it represents the practical pathway through which at least some losses might be returned.
• Commercial Cybersecurity Firms — Commercial cybersecurity firms are private sector companies that provide technical expertise, monitoring, forensic analysis, and threat intelligence. The order includes them because governments often rely on outside specialists to detect infrastructure, trace campaigns, and improve rapid response.
• Commensurate Response — A commensurate response is a response calibrated to match the seriousness and scale of a threat or harmful activity. In national security and law enforcement policy, the term refers to the use of proportional tools and authorities, which may include legal enforcement, diplomatic action, intelligence operations, financial sanctions, or other measures designed to counter the threat effectively.
• Complicit Officials — Complicit officials are foreign government representatives who knowingly tolerate, assist, or protect predatory schemes and related criminal operations. The term matters because the order contemplates consequences not only for criminals, but also for officials who help preserve impunity.
• Coordinated Federal Effort — A coordinated federal effort means multiple agencies working through a shared structure rather than acting in isolation. This matters because scam victims are often harmed by systems that are fragmented, slow, and difficult to navigate, while coordinated responses may improve speed and effectiveness.
• Critical Infrastructure Systems — Critical infrastructure systems are essential public and institutional systems whose disruption could seriously affect safety, governance, or daily life. Their inclusion in the order shows that cyber-enabled crime is seen as a broader societal threat, not only a private financial harm.
• Cyber-Enabled Criminal Activity — Cyber-enabled criminal activity refers to crime that uses digital tools, online systems, or networked communication to target victims or support criminal operations. This term is important because many modern scams depend on digital reach, anonymity, and rapid cross-border execution.
• Cyber-Enabled Fraud — Cyber-enabled fraud is fraud carried out through digital platforms, communication networks, or online financial systems that allow criminals to reach victims remotely. These operations often rely on coordinated infrastructure, automated tools, and organized teams that enable large numbers of victims to be targeted simultaneously across different countries.
• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, is the Homeland Security component tasked with strengthening defensive capacity and resilience. Its role matters because local governments and institutions often need technical support to recognize and respond to scam-related cyber threats.
• Department of Homeland Security — The Department of Homeland Security is assigned several operational and support functions in the order, including resilience building, coordination, and disruption support. Its presence signals that cyber-enabled fraud is being treated as a homeland protection issue, not merely a consumer complaint problem.
• Department of Justice Goal of Serving All Victims of Crime — This phrase points to the Justice Department’s stated responsibility to consider victims broadly when designing restoration efforts. It matters because scam victims have often felt overlooked, and the wording suggests a formal basis for including them in federal recovery frameworks.
• Detect, Disrupt, Dismantle, and Deter — This four-part enforcement formula describes a sequence of government action against scam networks and associated infrastructure. Each word reflects a different step, from identifying threats to breaking their operations apart and reducing the likelihood that they will continue.
• Diplomatic Consequences — Diplomatic consequences are penalties or state actions imposed through foreign policy tools rather than criminal prosecution alone. These may include pressure, isolation, or formal action against governments that refuse to address scam operations within their borders.
• Director of the Office of Management and Budget — The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is referenced in the general provisions to preserve existing budgetary and administrative functions. This matters because even urgent policy goals still depend on funding decisions, implementation planning, and federal administrative control.
• Digital Systems — Digital systems are the online and technical environments through which communication, payments, records, and services operate. The article emphasizes them because modern fraud exploits both human trust and technological systems at the same time.
• Enabling Infrastructure — Enabling infrastructure refers to the technical and operational systems that allow cybercrime to function, such as servers, domains, payment channels, and communication tools. Targeting this infrastructure can weaken criminal operations even when the individual perpetrators remain physically out of reach.
• Executive Department or Agency Authority — This phrase refers to the preexisting legal powers held by federal departments and agencies. It is important because the order does not erase or replace those powers, but instead directs them toward a more unified anti-fraud effort.
• Executive Order — An Executive Order is a formal presidential directive that instructs the federal government on policy priorities and implementation steps. In this case, it serves as the framework for a more aggressive and coordinated response to cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes.
• Expulsion of Foreign Officials and Diplomats — This measure refers to removing foreign officials or diplomats from the United States when they are complicit in tolerated predatory activity. Its inclusion signals that the order contemplates serious consequences for state-linked tolerance, not only for private criminals.
• Federal Prosecution Principles — Federal prosecution principles are the standards that guide prosecutors in selecting serious, provable charges and cases. For victims, this term matters because it suggests that authorities may focus on the strongest available legal pathways rather than symbolic or weak cases.
• Foreign Assistance Limitation — Foreign assistance limitation refers to reducing or restricting aid to countries that tolerate transnational criminal organizations involved in cyber-enabled fraud. This tool matters because it applies pressure at the government level, especially when criminal enforcement alone has little effect.
• Foreign Jurisdictions — Foreign jurisdictions are countries or legal territories outside the United States where scam networks, servers, facilitators, or proceeds may be located. This matters because victims often discover that the criminals who harmed them operate beyond the immediate reach of local law enforcement.
• Human Trafficking — Human trafficking appears in the policy description as part of the shadow economy surrounding cybercrime and predatory schemes. Its inclusion is important because many scam compounds and fraud centers may involve coercion, exploitation, and abuse of workers as well as victims.
• Intelligence Sharing — Intelligence sharing means the exchange of threat information, operational knowledge, or investigative insight between agencies or allied governments. This matters because criminal networks move quickly, and fragmented information can leave victims exposed while authorities work in isolation.
• Limitation of Foreign Assistance — Limitation of foreign assistance is a diplomatic penalty that reduces support to governments seen as failing to address tolerated scam activity. It shows that the order seeks leverage not only through law enforcement, but also through foreign policy consequences.
• Malicious Cyber Actors — Malicious cyber actors are the individuals, groups, or networked entities that conduct or support cybercrime, fraud, and predatory schemes. The phrase matters because it includes more than visible scammers, extending to technical operators, facilitators, and infrastructure managers.
• National Coordination Center — The National Coordination Center, or NCC, is the designated hub where an operational cell would coordinate federal efforts against foreign cyber-enabled criminal activity. This structure matters because a central hub can reduce delays, improve information flow, and support faster intervention.
• National Security Issue — A national security issue is a threat considered serious enough to affect the nation’s safety, stability, systems, or strategic interests. The article shows that cyber-enabled fraud is increasingly being framed this way, which expands the range of tools the government may use.
• Non-Federal Entities — Non-Federal entities are outside organizations, such as private companies or other partners, that may contribute expertise, data, or operational insight. Their inclusion matters because government agencies often need outside technical support to track and understand rapidly evolving scam ecosystems.
• Offensive Actions — Offensive actions are proactive measures taken to disrupt, disable, or counter harmful networks rather than only defend against them. In this context, the phrase signals a shift toward more assertive intervention against the infrastructure and operations that support large scam enterprises.
• Office of the National Cyber Director — The Office of the National Cyber Director is involved in consultation and coordination for the review and action plan. Its participation matters because cyber policy often fails when agencies are disconnected, and this office is meant to improve alignment at the national level.
• Operational Cell — An operational cell is a dedicated team created to coordinate targeted action against a defined threat. In the order, this concept matters because it signals a move away from diffuse responsibility toward a specialized unit focused on scam centers and foreign cyber-enabled crime.
• Predatory Schemes — Predatory schemes are fraud operations that exploit vulnerability, trust, fear, or dependency for criminal gain. This term matters because it highlights the abusive nature of scams and recognizes that many victims were targeted precisely because criminals identified emotional or situational openings.
• Private Sector Involvement — Private sector involvement means the participation of businesses and technical firms in detection, disruption, intelligence, or resilience support. This matters because much of the internet infrastructure used by scammers is privately operated, making non-government cooperation necessary for meaningful disruption.
• Public Alerts — Public alerts are warnings or informational notices intended to help the public recognize threats and reduce exposure to active schemes. Their importance lies in prevention, because clear and timely warnings may help potential victims interrupt a scam before severe losses occur.
• Rapid Response — Rapid response refers to the ability of agencies and partners to act quickly once a threat is identified. In scam prevention and cyber enforcement, speed matters because fraudulent campaigns can spread widely, move funds quickly, and disappear before slower systems react.
• Regulatory Frameworks — Regulatory frameworks are the rules, authorities, and administrative structures that shape how agencies and institutions respond to cybercrime and fraud. The order requires a review of these frameworks because outdated or fragmented rules can weaken enforcement and victim protection.
• Remission — Remission is the legal process through which recovered or forfeited funds may be returned to victims under authorized procedures. This term matters because it describes one of the formal mechanisms by which financial harm may be partially addressed after a scam.
• Resilience Building — Resilience building refers to strengthening systems, institutions, and local partners so they can better withstand, detect, and recover from cyber-enabled threats. For victims and communities, it matters because prevention is not only about catching criminals, but also about reducing future vulnerability.
• Scam Centers — Scam centers are organized operations where fraud is carried out systematically, often using scripted conversations, digital communication platforms, and coordinated teams of operators. These facilities function as structured criminal workplaces designed to manipulate victims at scale, allowing fraud groups to run multiple scams simultaneously while controlling communication, payment instructions, and psychological pressure on victims.
• Seized Funds — Seized funds are assets taken by authorities because they are linked to criminal conduct or criminal proceeds. Their relevance to victims is direct, since those recovered funds may become the basis for restoration rather than disappearing entirely into general government accounts.
• Shadow Economy — The shadow economy refers to illicit financial and operational systems that function outside lawful oversight and formal regulation. These hidden networks often support stolen identities, coercion, forced labor, trafficking, and organized cyber-enabled fraud that targets victims across international borders.
• SLTT Partners — SLTT stands for State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners that help detect, report, and respond to threats closer to affected communities. Their role matters because victims often first encounter local systems, and stronger local capacity may improve reporting and early intervention.
• State Support — State support refers to direct or indirect backing, protection, or tolerance provided by a foreign regime to cybercrime and predatory schemes. This concept is important because it explains why some scam networks operate so openly and remain difficult to shut down.
• Targeted Sanctions — Targeted sanctions are focused penalties aimed at specific individuals, entities, or facilitators connected to harmful conduct. They matter because they can raise the cost of participation in scam ecosystems without requiring immediate arrest or physical access to the offenders.
• Technical Capabilities — Technical capabilities are the tools, systems, and expertise used to detect, trace, attribute, and disrupt cyber threats. Their inclusion in the order reflects the reality that large scam networks cannot be confronted effectively through interviews and paperwork alone.
• Threat Intelligence — Threat intelligence is analyzed information about malicious actors, tactics, infrastructure, or emerging risks. For victims and communities, it matters because better intelligence can support earlier warnings, faster disruption, and more accurate identification of the networks causing harm.
• Trade Penalties — Trade penalties are economic consequences imposed on governments that fail to act against tolerated predatory activity. This matters because it expands the response beyond criminal law and uses economic leverage to pressure cooperation.
• Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) — Transnational criminal organizations, often abbreviated as TCOs, are structured criminal groups that operate across multiple national borders while coordinating illegal activities through networks of personnel, finances, and infrastructure. These organizations often manage large fraud systems, money laundering channels, and logistical support that allow scams and other criminal enterprises to function internationally.
• Victim Restoration Program — The Victim Restoration Program is the proposed mechanism for returning recovered funds to people harmed by cyber-enabled fraud schemes. It is especially important because it moves federal policy closer to recognizing that victims need financial rebuilding support, not only criminal prosecution.
• Visa Restrictions — Visa restrictions are limits placed on entry to the United States for foreign individuals connected to tolerated or supported predatory activity. Their importance lies in signaling that governments and affiliated actors may face personal consequences when they enable large fraud ecosystems.